The National Industrial Conference

This chapter has attempted to discover the purposes of the Triple Alliance. Up till now, the results of this examination are somewhat sketchy, incomplete, The Constitution, and the statements of the 'Founding Fathers’ of the Alliance seems to point in the direction of collective action for matters of ‘a national character or vitally affecting a principle’. During and after the First World War the Alliance dealt with a whole range of matters but none of them seemed to be a Triple Alliance matter per se. The war and demobilisation problems which the Alliance discussed with the Government, were all matters that concerned the whole Labour movement, that should have been dealt with by the bodies that represented labour in general and that partially were dealt with by them. No wonder that some of the leaders were not sure, whether it was right, that the Alliance took these matters up, Other matters, like nationalisation, housing, conscription etc., were immediately referred to the TUC and the Labour Party. The part the Alliance played here, was to take the initiative to let these problems discussed in these bodies. That leaves the 'pure and simple’ trade union matters. It appeared, that the affiliated unions preferred to deal with them unilaterally. The Alliance was only used to back up their demands, or - as in the September 1919 Railway Strike - not even for that. They relied primarily on their own strength, and when that seemed to fail, they appealed to the Alliance. In tho first post—war years, this attitude appeared to be relatively successful, the more bo as the Government wanted to avoid a direct confrontation. The Government was determined, however, to end this situation, as soon as the post-war problems had been overcome. At that time the unions did not realise this, and neglected the way-out the Government offered them: the Whitley Councils and the National Industrial Conference.

In 1917. the Whitley Committee on the Relations of Employers and Employed recomrnended to set to councils composed of both employers and union leaders, such committees, it was believed, constituted in each industry both at the national level and at the local and even workshop level, could meet the demand for 'workers’ control’. They were to discuss not only wages and conditions, but also general problems of industrial efficiency and management. Smillie, a member of the Whitley Committee, said at the 1917 Congress:

The real meaning of this report (the Whitley Report, spr.) is as to whether we are going to attempt to set up joint machinery to negotiate in connection with threatened disputes, or whether it would be better for the Trade Unions to "be without the means of ending disputes in a conciliatory way. This scheme is proposed in the interests of the nation and of the workpeople themselves.

He hoped that the TUC would accept this proposal, but his own MFGB rejected the whole schome. The NTWF accepted it, but rather reluctantly. Bevin had his doubts about the possibility of creating Labour’s right position in relation to industry by means of a joint committee of employers and workmen. The NUR was also not content with the scheme laid down in the Whitley Report. They held the opinion that it did not sufficiently safeguard the interets of Labour, and demanded a complete recognition of the NUR on all matters arising between members and their employers.

Early in 1919, the Government expressed its desire to call a National Industrial Conference of employers and Labour representatives to discuss matters of industrial relations. Although the Government was met with suspicion about its true motives, the first NIC was held on 27 February 1919. As rnentioned above, J.H. Thomas adressed the conference on behalf of the Alliance, and that was the last it wanted to have to do with it. It did not want to be represented on the Joint Committee, that was appointed by the NIC, and that afterwards considered questions relating to hours, wages and general conditions of employment, unemployment and its prevention, and the best methods of promoting co-operation between capital and labour. Nor did it want to play any other active part in this. The Triple Alliance looked on the NIC as another device of Lloyd George’s to keep the trade unions talking and thereby gain a breathing space until the country settled down and the demand for sweeping changes - as expressed in the National Programmes, about which they were bargaining at that moment - had exhausted itself. They felt that the promises it suggested were no more likely of fulfilment than the abundant pledges of social improvement made by Lloyd George on many previous occasions.

It is arguable, whether the Alliance - and the Engineers, who stayed aloof as we11 - were right in this attitude. Roberts pointed out, that Lloyd George gave the impression that the calling of a NIC was a tactical move; he was mainly concerned in setting over the crisis in industrial relations, and it may be doubted that he had any wish to see the Joint Committee, that was formed at the Conference, explore the deeper issues involved. Suspicion of the motives of the Government and the employers, he stated, was not confined to the Triple Alliance and the left wing of the Labour rnovement, but Henderson and most members of the PC had no wish to see the country plunged into industrial strife; it was realised that this was likely to end in disaster for both the unions and the Party. Later events seemed to affirm this suspicion. The Joint Committee proposed to form a permanent National Industrial Council, of which the object would be an advisory function to supplement and co-ordinate the existing sectional machinery and the recognition of that body by the Government as the official consultative authority to the Government upon industrial relations. With these went practical proposals concerning minimum wages, hours and unemployment.

The practical proposals were partly implemented, but the Government showed no concern to see the Joint Committee about the more principal ones. The Committee, therefore, resigned in disgust in 1921, which meant the end of the NIC. As reasons for its attitude the then Minister of Labour, T.J. MacNamara mentioned in the Commons, that some of the largest and most important of the trade unions did not participate, that the response of trade unions to the promotion of a NIC did not indicate a favourable opinion towards them, and that trade unions and employers’ associations preferred to act industry by industry. Although one can detect some opportunism in this statement, the Government showed no alarm at the attitude of the trade union movement. Triple Alliance and the Engineers stayed aloof, the 1919 Congress was not even concerned to discuss the NIC; and the trade union representatives on the Joint Committee showed themselves to be highly critical of the Government and the employers. In a Memorandum to the NIC - appended to the first report of the Joint Committee - they mentioned as the causes for industrial unrest - the breakdown of the existing capitalist system of industrial organisation, which made a vast extention of public ownership and democratic control of industry urgently necessary and that — there was no indication that either the Government or the employers had realised the necessity for any fundamental change, or that they were prepared even to make a beginning of industrial re-organisation on more democratic principles.

The result might have been much different if the trade union movement as a whole would have been more positive towards a NIC the absence of the representatives of the important industries - Allen pointed out - was a matter for rejoicing by the Government and not regret. It prevented the Government from continuing on a road, that it had itself - perhaps not fully wholeheartedly - indicated to unions and employers. Nobody but Glynes, however, seemed to regret this. Glynes greatly regretted that the Government allowed this splendid opportunity to pass, because the NIC might have been a regular supervisor of the national interests in relation to trade.